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ABSTRACT 
Command and Control (C2) by today’s embarked commanders requires timely and 
reliable access to classified data systems at the C2 node provided by the ship.  Most 
often, the ship’s spaces provided to an embarked staff are inadequate to support the 
commander’s C2 requirements.  Often, there are not enough classified computers or 
classified Local Area Network (LAN) connections.  To facilitate improved ability to 
exercise C2, a ship’s company technicians typically place a hub on the network to 
provide extra connection points.  This procedure takes time for the technicians to 
implement and requires physical connection to the wired network.  A potential alternative 
may be to leverage current IEEE 802.11 technology to provide wireless connectivity for 
these clients, yet wireless technology alone will not address this problem.  Coupling an 
802.11 network with Secret Client Tunneling Device (SCTD)-enabled classified laptops 
can provide the access to classified data that is required by the embarked commander to 
exercise command and control of his assigned forces.  This thesis examines the use of the 
KOV-26 Talon card and the KIV-54 cryptographic module, both NSA Type I encryptors, 
as a method of tunneling SIPRNet data across an afloat unclassified wireless Local Area 
Network (LAN). 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The speed with which information becomes available to a commander and his 
staff in the modern combat environment dictates that they have access to this information 
when, and where, it is required.  Command and control (C2) by today’s embarked 
commanders requires timely and reliable access to classified data systems at the C2 node 
provided by the ship.  Most often, the spaces provided to an embarked staff are 
inadequate to support the commander’s C2 requirements.  Frequently, there are not 
enough classified computers or classified Local Area Network (LAN) connections to 
support the commander or his staff cells.  An even greater challenge is when there are no 
available connections to allow classified connectivity.  To facilitate some ability to 
exercise C2, a ship’s company technicians will routinely place a hub on the network to 
provide extra connection points.  This procedure takes time for the technicians to 
implement, as they must attempt to physically connect to the SIPRNet.  With most spaces 
on a ship not serviced by existing SIPRNet connections, this requires running network 
cables through cableways from remote spaces.  Even with this solution, there are still 
many spaces onboard that could not be serviced by running cables, as the nearest access 
to SIPRNet is farther than the maximum distances allowed by network cabling. A 
potential alternative may be to leverage current IEEE 802.11 technology to provide 
wireless connectivity for these clients. 
B. OVERVIEW 
Use of a wireless solution in a shipboard environment has been employed in a 
small number of implementations since 2009 [1], and with the Consolidated Afloat 
Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) program, every surface combatant in the 
U.S. Navy will have a working unclassified wireless LAN installed [2].  The current 
wireless LAN implementations are proving to be successful for mobility within the ship.  
Personnel become more efficient as they can move around while maintaining 
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connectivity with Personal Digital Assistants (PDA) and laptops.  The current shipboard 
wireless network configuration is implemented as an extension of the ship’s Non-
classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) [1].  Classified connectivity for 
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) clients could be provided in much the 
same manner.  However, running a separate wireless network to support SIPRNet 
connectivity would not only be costly in terms of implementation and maintenance, but 
would incite concerns of security and interference.  One method however, demonstrates 
promise as a means to accomplishing the goal of transporting classified data across 
unclassified lines.  This method is tunneling. 
Tunneling encrypted SIPRNet data across the NIPRNet wireless extension is 
feasible through the use of either a KOV-26 (Talon) or a KIV-54 (SecNet54), both of 
which are NSA approved Type I encryptors.  The concept to tunnel SIPRNet data across 
a NIPRNet was tested onboard USS Cole (DDG-67) during exercise TRIDENT 
WARRIOR 2011 (TW11), utilizing both the KOV-26 and the KIV-54 in the technology 
demonstration.  Based on the results of the performance of SIPRNet clients observed 
using each of these devices, we intend to assess the potential this technology exhibits to 
support an embarked staff and its C2 requirements. 
Additionally, we intend to address a secondary requirement of handling this 
classified data when it resides on the SIPRNet host.  Data when not in transport or being 
processed by the host, but in storage for future use, is said to be data-at-rest.  This data 
must also be protected, whether through physical or cryptographic means.  Data-at-rest 
on an SCTD-enabled host must be protected  to maintain the confidentially of that data.  
C. CHALLENGE OF SUPPORTING C2 REQUIREMENTS OF AN 
EMBARKED COMMANDER  
Command and Control (C2) between an embarked commander and his 
subordinate units is challenging when the embarked platform is not configured to support 
the classified information requirements of the commander and his staff.  Through the 
implementation of a wireless tunneling solution, greater flexibility will be afforded to 
both the embarking staff and the ship’s company to support Command and Control (C2) 
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requirements in the spaces to which the staff is assigned.  Study of the tunneling of 
SIPRNet data over a NIPRNet wireless network is required to validate the potential for a 
permanent classified wireless implementation. 
D. SCOPE 
Although C2 is not necessarily limited to a technology problem, the proper 
application of technological solutions as an enabler of C2 is vital to maximizing the speed 
of command as it pertains to the six elements of C2. Admiral Willard, current commander 
of U.S. Pacific Command, defines the six elements of command and control as 1) 
maintain alignment, 2) provide situational awareness, 3) advance the plan, 4) comply 
with procedure, 5) counter the enemy, and 6) adjust apportionment [3].  These elements 
are better served by a responsive system of information flows, contributing to the speed 
of command. 
  It is imperative that the speed of command is faster than that of our adversaries, 
allowing U.S and Allied commanders to be opportunistic while forcing the enemy to be 
reactionary.  These outcomes are dependent upon the receipt of timely and accurate 
information, the rapid processing of that data, and the fast promulgation of intent and 
taskings.  The intent is to enhance the commander’s ability to exercise C2 of assigned 
forces from locations that may not necessarily be equipped to support his requirements.  
It is in this information domain and its effect on C2, that this thesis focuses.    
E. METHODOLOGY 
The design of this research centers around the implementation of two wireless 
tunneling technologies used in conjunction with an installed, functional wireless LAN 
onboard a U.S Navy warship.  The methodology employed for this thesis consists of a 
literature review—including examination of operator surveys from previous 
experiments—operator surveys and subject-matter expert (SME) observations during 
TW11.  An analysis of the data collected by using an unclassified wireless LAN to tunnel 
classified data, can demonstrate whether employment of either, or both, technologies 
adds value to the C2 nodes established by an embarked commander.  Based on the results 
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of the surveys and observations, a recommendation will be made considering a 
permanent tunneling solution that may be implemented across the fleet. 
F. THESIS INTENT 
The installation of unclassified wireless LANs on all surface combatants under 
the CANES program will ensure that all combatants will have an 802.11 wireless 
network onboard.  However, it is installed to support unclassified requirements and will 
not address access to classified data.  To enhance an embarked commander’s ability to 
exercise command and control of assigned forces in any space throughout his flagship, 
the wireless LAN must be exploited to allow access to classified information.  Without 
access to the classified networks, operational and tactical situational awareness cannot be 
maintained in many spaces throughout the ship that are not served by the wired classified 
network.  Use of Secret Client Tunneling Devices (SCTDs) will provide the commander 
and his staff access to the classified network throughout the ship.  It is this capability that 
is the focus of this thesis. 
By applying survey research, an understanding of an enhanced C2 capability to 
support embarked commanders of afloat units may be ascertained. 
This thesis will answer two questions: 
    How can Command and Control (C2) requirements of an embarked 
commander be enhanced by using a KOV-26 (TALON) or KIV-54 
(SecNet54) enabled SIPRNet laptop to tunnel data over an unclassified 
wireless connection? 
    How can the Type I encryption, or Suite-B technology, be used to 
address data tunneling and data-at-rest at the SECRET level? 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into the following five chapters: 
Chapter I frames the problem set that the thesis will address.  Chapter II provides 
background information that is important to understand as it applies to the problem set.  
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This chapter discusses the history of 802.11 wireless Local Area Networks (LAN) and its 
use in the shipboard environment.  It further describes the tunneling technologies that 
were demonstrated during the TRIDENT WARRIOR 2011 (TW11).  Chapter III defines 
the measured figures of merit.  These figures of merit include 1) usability, the perceived 
latency, or responsiveness, of the system, and the ease of use with which an untrained 
user can setup the device, manipulate data found on the network external to the host, and 
securing the system for storage; 2) availability, a measurement of the accessibility of the 
network and the services that it provides to the user; and 3) persistence, the consistency 
with which a network connection is maintained.  It presents the methodology used to 
collect the data during TW11, and a detailed analysis of that data.  Chapter IV assesses 
the constraints and operational utility of extending the classified network as a method to 
enhance C2 capabilities of an embarked U.S. or Allied commander and his staff.  It also 
makes the distinction between each SCTD as to how they would most likely be employed 
in an operational context.  Chapter V, the final chapter, provides the conclusions made 
based on the research and offers some suggestions for future research. 
 6
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II. TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 
A. WIRELESS NETWORKING 
In 2006, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Navy authorized the use 
of wireless networking technology throughout the Global Information Grid (GIG).  In 
October 2006, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) (OPNAV N6) transmitted 
NAVADMIN 06/283 that provided additional guidance for the implementation and 
installation of wireless networking components.  Throughout this message, security is 
mentioned as a major factor for consideration of a Wireless LAN (WLAN) 
implementation. 
All WLAN traffic shall be protected by Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) 140–2 certified devices or technologies that authenticate 
and encrypt at or below Layer 2 of the Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) reference model.  While some of the guidance cited herein may 
identify encryption at a higher OSI layer as being acceptable, the Navy 
DAA shall only accept solutions that provide encryption at layer 2 or 
below. [4]   
Although at first glance this policy appears to fall short of what one would expect 
to be issued as guidance for protecting data, the requirement stems from the unique 
aspects of wireless LAN technology as compared to wired technology.  Network security 
approaches for unclassified, wired networks make the assumption that the wired LAN 
connection is secure.  As a result, security mechanisms concentrate on layer 3 and above.  
The Navy’s approach to integrating commercial WLAN technology into the enterprise 
architecture is to secure the components of the network that directly pertain to the 
wireless portion of the wireless LAN to make it as secure, or more secure than that of a 
wired LAN.  It is this thinking that dictates a focus on securing the network at layer 2.  It 
is also required that the wireless client device will be maintained under the same 
configuration controls that apply to wired LAN devices for information assurance and 
security [5]. 
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Further, NAVADMIN 06/283 discusses the use and storage of classified 
information over the wireless network.   
Wireless devices shall not store, process, or transmit classified information 
unless using assured channels employing National Security Agency (NSA) 
approved Type-I encryption.  Type-II (FIPS 140–2) encryption is not 
certified by NSA and is not authorized for protecting classified 
information. [4]   
The Navy has completed considerable testing of afloat WLAN technologies since 
this message was promulgated in 2006.  In 2007, USS Cole (DDG-67) became the first 
Navy warship to have a functioning wireless network.  Since then, several ships including 
USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), USS Howard (DDG-83), and HSV-2 SWIFT have 
had unclassified wireless networks installed.  Additionally, USS San Antonio (LPD-17) 
has WLAN coverage throughout its superstructure, including its “well-deck” [6] from 
where its landing craft are launched. 
Although security and frequency interference are considerations that must be 
addressed when installing WLAN on a warship, there are several benefits to having an 
unclassified wireless network installed.  These benefits include mobility, cost savings, 
and installation flexibility [7]. 
 Mobility as a benefit of a wireless LAN is defined as a user being able to access 
real-time information no matter where the user is located in the network.  This mobility 
enhances the user’s ability to efficiently perform his job requirements, and provides 
greater flexibility than that of a wired network [8].  As an example, a technician who is 
working on a faulty towed array sonar in the Tactical Towed Array Sonar (TACTAS) 
room onboard a DDG will have to access electronic documents that are embedded in the 
sonar suite in the forward—and remote—part of the ship, but has no computer access in 
TACTAS.  With a wireless LAN, the technician can be able to access information stored 
on the network to help him complete repairs in the space where he is working.  If the 
technician requires technical assistance to complete the repairs, a wireless classified 
computer can provide access to chat to allow near real-time communications with a 
technical representative ashore. 
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The cost savings that a wireless LAN provides is a true benefit.  Although there is 
an initial investment associated with the wireless hardware and its installation, the overall 
cost of ownership and life cycle costs are dramatically lower than that of installing wired 
network switches and penetrating bulkheads to run network cabling as temporary 
requirements necessitate [8].  Once a wireless LAN is installed with adequate coverage 
throughout the ship, it costs virtually nothing to extend the network to spaces that do not 
have wired coverage. 
Having flexibility with the installation of network connections in a location where 
those connections would provide value is a tremendous benefit [8].  Often when a staff 
embarks a ship, the spaces that ship provides the staff do not have the required number of 
network connections to adequately support the staff.  In order to support the staff, a ship 
that is not configured with a wireless LAN will split an existing connection with a hub to 
support the staff.  In cases where the space the staff has been given has no connections, 
the ship’s technicians must run cabling from an existing connection through bulkhead 
stuffing tubes or watertight doors.  A wireless LAN provides the flexibility to have 
required computer systems wherever the staff needs them. 
1. 802.11b/g 
The Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) standards evolved from the first 
standard created by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).  Initially 
created in 1997, the IEEE 802.11 standard has evolved through much iteration, and 
continues to grow today as the requirements for greater data capacity and increased 
speed-of-access to that data are demanded by the consumer [9].  
To address the improved data and speed requirements, the 802.11b standard was 
published in September 1999.  This standard defined three physical layers designed to 
provide different data rates, using the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) 2.4 GHz 
band.  The physical layers that it defined are Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
(FHSS), Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), and Infra-red (IR) [9]. Although all 
three are still defined, the IR definition never gained in popularity, and is not a viable 
option for LAN connectivity due to lack of commercial products.   
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Both FHSS and DSSS were defined in the original 802.11 standard, but each only 
provided for a data rate of 1 or 2 Megabits per second (Mbps).  In the 802.11b standard, 
not only does it define DSSS to ensure compatibility with devices produced to the 802.11 
standard, but it also defines High Rate-Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (HR-DSSS), 
with data rates of 5.5 and 11Mbps.  This improved data rate, coupled with its 
compatibility with previous 802.11 DSSS devices, propelled the 802.11b standard to the 
forefront of popularity, and its implementation became the most common version of the 
WLAN standard of its time [10].  As improved versions of the 802.11 standard became 
further defined, they provided backwards compatibility to the 802.11b defined devices. 
Although 802.11b is popular, it still does not provide a spectacular data rate.  As 
consumers demanded more capacity, the IEEE continued to refine the 802.11 standards to 
meet that demand.  In 2003, an amendment was ratified that defined the 802.11g 
standard.  This standard implemented the use of Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiplexing (OFDM) at the 2.4GHz ISM band, and provided for data rates up to 
54Mbps.  Since 802.11g works in the same ISM band as that of 802.11b devices, it 
provides interoperability between the two standards, allowing consumers that have made 
considerable investment into an 802.11b WLAN to maintain their current infrastructure 
while upgrading key nodes of their network to 802.11g devices [9]. 
B. SECURE CLIENT TUNNELING DEVICE (SCTD):  KOV-26 AND KIV-54 
DESCRIPTIONS 
1. KOV-26 Talon Description 
The first of the Secure Client Tunneling Devices (SCTD) considered for purposes 
of this thesis is the KOV-26 Talon, a National Security Agency (NSA) approved Type I 
encryptor that allows users to access data up to a level of Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) that is developed and marketed by L3 
Communications.  It is designed as a multi-interface High Assurance Internet Protocol 




Association (PCMCIA) form factor.  It can provide classified data communications via 
an 802.11b or 802.11g WLAN, wired Ethernet, V.90 modem, or an RS-232 
connection [11]. 
The Talon card is considered a Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) when it is 
not inserted into a designated laptop, and an authenticated user or Site Security Officer 
(SSO) is not logged onto the Talon Host Software (THS).  It remains CCI when inserted 
into a designated laptop, as long as no authenticated user or SSO logs onto that THS[11].  
As CCI, it is considered unclassified, but must be controlled as an accountable item [12].  
When the Talon card is inserted into an authorized computer, and an authenticated user or 
SSO is logged into the THS, then the device becomes classified to the level of the keying 
material installed in the Talon.  To return the Talon card to the state of a CCI, the 
authenticated user or SSO must either log out of the THS, or they can simply remove the 




Figure 1.   The Talon and Its Tactical Kit Accessories. From [11]. 
The KOV-26 Talon card provides for up to 15 users per card.  This can be one 
user per card on 15 configured laptops, 15 users on one laptop, or a combination not to 
exceed 15 (i.e., five user accounts on three different laptops.)  As it is configured, the 
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Talon can only support one user logged on to one computer at a time.  Although the 
Talon provides greater portability than the SecNet54, it does not provide bulk encryption 
for multiple computers simultaneously. 
The value of the Talon card is its portability—its ability to take a classified laptop 
throughout the ship and allow classified network access in any space that has NIPRNet 
connectivity, whether by 802.3 Ethernet network connections or by an 802.11b/g WLAN.  
In the case of an embarked DESRON commander, the Commodore or his designated staff 
members can have classified access in multiple spaces throughout the ship.  As an 
example, the Staff TAO (STAO) stationed at a location in the Combat Information Center 
(CIC), which does not have classified computer access, can be augmented by a Talon 
enabled classified computer.  This would allow the STAO to access his required 
Command and Control (C2) applications, such as chat, e-mail, and the Collaboration At 
Sea (CAS) portal.  The STAO and the Commodore can now exercise C2 of assigned 
forces from virtually any location on the ship. 
2.  KIV-54 SecNet54 Description 
The second SCTD considered for this thesis is the KIV-54 SecNet54, a product 
line of bulk encryptors that provides access to both wireless and wired networks, 
depending on the modules that have been installed.  It is an NSA approved Type I 
cryptographic device certified to handle data traffic up to TS/SCI.  The SecNet54 is made 
up of the cryptographic module and a choice of external modules.  The external modules 
available for the SecNet54 are the Radio module (RMOD), which allows a connection to 
802.11b/g networks, and the Ethernet module (EMOD), which provides for connectivity 
to 802.3 wired networks [14].   
The SecNet54 is handled as CCI prior to a user or administrator activating a key 
through an SSL certificate secured web application.  Its classification is set by the 
administrator through this web application and it only activates keys compatible to that 




module (CMOD) and external Radio module (RMOD) or Ethernet module (EMOD) as 
both separate units and combined to make one operational unit, as a wireless interface 









Figure 3.   SecNet54 Cryptographic Module and Ethernet Module.  From [17]. 
The SecNet54 does require an external power source.  Power can be provided 
from an included power supply, battery power, or it can be provided by an 802.3af Power 
over Ethernet (PoE) device [16].  The power options of the SecNet54 make it less 
portable than the KOV-26, which receives its power from the host laptop.   
To connect classified computers, the SecNet54 can be plugged directly into a 
computer or a switch.  By attaching a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) switch to the 
SecNet54 by way of an ethernet connection, the administrator is able to have multiple 
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hosts attached to one SecNet54 device, creating a classified enclave.  The true value of 
the SecNet54 is being able to create an enclave of multiple computers in a space that does 
not have classified network access.  Figure 4 shows a single SecNet54 connected to a 
Cisco switch to provide multiple hosts access to the tunneling device. 
 
 
Figure 4.   SecNet54 Radio Module Providing Tunneling Services to Switch.1 
In order to support an embarked commander, the SecNet54 can be used to create a 
classified workspace for his staff in a space that has at least one NIPRNet connection or 
is serviced by a NIPRNet wireless LAN.  In the case when a DESRON commander 
embarks on a DDG, the staff is most often given the classroom as its workspace.  On 
most DDGs the classroom has one or two NIPRNet connections with no available 
SIPRNet connections.  By installing the SecNet54 into a NIPRNet connection utilizing 
the EMOD and using a COTS switch, the classroom becomes a classified workspace for 
the staff by providing multiple classified computers with classified network access. 
                                                 
1 Photo courtesy of Mr. Paul Johnson, Harris Corporation systems engineer. 
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C. SUITE-B/FIPS140–2 COMPLIANCE IMPLICATIONS AND 
SHORTFALLS 
FIPS140–2 specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module 
utilized within the security system protecting sensitive information in computer and 
telecommunication systems.  These security requirements are defined for separate 
security levels.  Security Level 1 is the minimum security requirement.  Basic security 
requirements, such as utilizing at least one approved algorithm or approved security 
function, are specified.  Additionally, Security Level 1 does not require specific physical 
security mechanisms [18]. 
 Security Level 2 enhances the physical security mechanisms by adding the 
requirement of tamper-evidence, such as tamper-resistant seals or pick resistant locks 
placed on doors or removable covers.  This protects the device against unauthorized 
physical access, and makes it apparent when unauthorized access has been attained.  
Additionally, Security Level 2 requires role-based authentication in which a 
cryptographic module authenticates the authorization of an operator to perform a specific 
role and that role’s service set [18]. 
 Security Levels 3 and 4 provide increasing security requirements, respectively, 
with Level 4 providing the highest level of security in the FIPS 140–2 standard.  Level 4 
cryptographic modules are best utilized for operations in physically unprotected 
environments [18].  Although attainment of Level 3 or Level 4 is desired, the increased 
costs associated with that attainment is not justified in the physically secure environment 
of a Navy warship. 
As described in NAVADMIN 06/283, wireless networks must comply with 
FIPS140–2 Level 1, and the transfer of classified data over the wireless network must be 
encrypted with Type-I bulk encryption.  The wireless networks currently fielded by the 
U.S. Navy are comprised of 3eTI wireless network devices which are certified FIPS140–
2 Level 2 compliant.  Devices that wish to access this wireless network must be mutually 
authenticated using the Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security 
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(EAP-TLS) [4].  This security method addresses the access to the unclassified network by 
authorized devices.  The method does not address confidentiality of classified data. 
As discussed previously, the KOV26 and KIV54 provide NSA Type-I bulk 
encryption of classified data, up to TS/SCI, which allows that encrypted data to be 
transported on an unclassified network.  However, most requirements for the KOV26 and 
KIV54 are for data that is classified at SECRET or below, which makes this type of 
encryption suitable for consideration of Suite-B devices [19]. 
NSA is moving toward Suite-B cryptography as an answer to the need for the 
secure sharing of information down to the tactical user up to the SECRET level.  To 
satisfy this requirement, NSA feels that approved information assurance solutions must 
be widely available and affordable for the user.  As a result, the NSA has initiated three 
efforts to meet these objectives: 
1. The Cryptographic Interoperability Strategy  
2. Expanding the use of GOTS products that meet a revised set of 
security standards to protect information up to the SECRET level; 
and 
3. Layered use of COTS products that meet a more robust set of 
security standards to protect information up to the SECRET level. 
[19]  
Suite-B is being designed to complement existing policy regarding the use of the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which protects national security information 
systems and the data that resides on most systems.  Suite-B includes cryptographic 
algorithms for hashing, digital signatures, and key exchange [20]. 
The main aspect of Suite-B Cryptography is its use of elliptic curve technology 
instead of traditional public key technology.  There are 26 patents held by Certicom, Inc., 
that the NSA has licensed rights for the use with respect to the Suite-B elliptic curve 
technology.  To facilitate the utilization of Suite-B by commercial industry, NSA’s 
license includes the right to grant a sublicense to vendors building certain products or 
components that can be used for protecting national security information [19]. 
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D. CAPABILITIES 
The benefits of implementing an SCTD architecture are the same as the benefits 
of implementing a wireless LAN afloat.  In fact, SCTD provides mobility, cost savings, 
and installation flexibility, all at the classified data level.  It is at this level that command 
and control (C2) by a commander of assigned forces resides.  As commanders and their 
staffs move from ship to ship, and as their C2 nodes change configuration based on the 
ship-assigned space in which the commander and his staff work, it is incumbent on the 
ship to comply to the information protection requirements dictated by the commander and 
established policies.  By using either SCTD solution, whether over a wired or wireless 
network, C2 of assigned forces will be enhanced by this extension the classified network.  
For SCTD usage to be successful, it cannot introduce latency to the command and 
control equation.  Both the KOV 26 and the KIV 54 introduce no significant latency, and 
in some cases improve noticed latency.  By tunneling through a robust unclassified 
network, the ideal situation is that the user notices very little difference between working 
on the ship’s classified network–a desktop computer attached to a standard configuration 
network connection–with that of working with an SCTD extended laptop.  This capability 
will not only enhance the C2 of U.S. Navy commanders, but will enhance the C2 
requirements of coalition commanders and sister-service combat elements, such as 
embarked Marine units, on U.S. Navy vessels. 
Further, the fleets of the U.S. Navy are each tasked to conduct Theater Security 
Cooperation operations with coalition partner nations.  Such engagement activities often 
come in the form of mutual exercise participation, in which the coalition partner embarks 
a United States ship to act as the commander of assigned forces.  This requires that 
commander and his staff the ability to conduct command and control from the spaces the 
ship provides.  The SCTD can be used to extend the classified coalition network to these 
spaces.  As an example, either SCTD could be keyed with the CENTRIXS key, and 
moved to any space on the ship. 
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E. CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS 
Although use of an SCTD has great potential for enhancing command and control 
of an embarked commander by extending the classified C2 network, there are policy 
limitations that govern the use of these classified devices. 
A limitation to using the SCTD, especially with coalition partners, is the 
accountability requirements for a device at a classification level or at rest as a CCI 
device.  When either the KOV26 or the KIV54 is logged on by an authorized user or 
SSO, the SCTD and enabled client is classified to the level for which the data is 
keyed [11], [15].   
As both SCTDs are designed for bulk encryption of data across the transport 
layer, they do not address the classification of the data at rest.  As data is being generated 
or retrieved on the client device, it is being stored on that client.  This requires strict 
adherence to Department of Defense and Department of the Navy physical security and 
Information Assurance (IA) policies.  It is also pertinent to point out that, although an 
organization can extend the classified network through use of SCTDs, care must be taken 
as to where the network is extended.  Even though a user has the capability to use an 
SCTD enabled client in an otherwise unclassified space, such as on the mess deck, the 
user must be aware of his surroundings.  It is possible that a Sailor who does not possess 
a clearance may be able to shoulder-surf to gain classified information.  The ease with 
which an SCTD can be used may actually increase the potential for this kind of exploit. 
This chapter has discussed the principles of wireless LAN technology and its 
related security as required by DoD and DON instructions.  It also provided background 
on the KOV26 Talon card and the KIV54 SecNet54, NSA approved Type-1 encryptors 
that allow the tunneling of classified data across an unclassified wired or wireless 
network.  It is these devices that were demonstrated during Trident Warrior 2011 
(TW2011) onboard USS Cole to qualitatively determine the usability and persistence of 
connection of both devices on an afloat wireless LAN. 
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III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. TRIDENT WARRIOR 2011 (TW11) 
1. Exercise Overview 
Trident Warrior (TW) is an annual fleet experiment designed to improve 
warfighting policies and capabilities by providing answers to detailed analytical questions 
about more than 50 critical maritime initiatives included in the experiment’s execution.  
TW11 provided an organized and streamlined venue to experiment with many possible 
solutions to the Fleet’s current and future challenges, resulting in consistent in-depth 
analysis to Navy’s decision makers.  TW11 included at-sea experimentation of initiatives 
and developing or improving tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to aid maritime 
forces; encompassing all aspects of the modern warfare spectrum—air, land, sea, and 
cyber.  For 2011, Trident Warrior was conducted in the SECOND Fleet and FIFTH Fleet 
Areas of Operations (AO) [21].  The studies outlined in this thesis occurred from July 25 
to August 1 during the SECOND Fleet portion of TW11. 
2. Secure Client Tunneling Devices (SCTD) Technology Demonstrations 
TW11 marked the second time the KOV-26 was demonstrated on an afloat 
wireless network.  It was tested previously on USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) during 
Trident Warrior 2010 (TW10) in the THIRD Fleet AO.  During TW10, the wireless 
network used to evaluate Talon was installed specifically for TW10.  Although it was 
considered successful, with the Talon demonstrating the ability to provide a usable and 
persistent connection to SIPRNet, it did not truly test the connection through a ship’s 
organic wireless LAN. 
During TW11, the KIV-54 was added to the testing of SCTDs.  Both the 
SecNet54 and the Talon were tested to demonstrate a usable and persistent connection 
over an organic afloat NIPRNet-hosted wireless LAN. The demonstration was conducted 
aboard the USS Cole. By the very nature of testing on a fielded WLAN at sea, the intent 
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of the demonstration was to definitively prove that there is value in fielding the KOV-26 
or the KIV-54, or both, to enhance C2 resource access by an embarked commander. 
To connect either SCTD to USS Cole’s wireless architecture, a KG-175D was 
installed in the Radio Room onboard the Cole.  The KG-175D is an encryption device 
that handles the encrypted packets from the Talon or the SecNet54, acting as the bridge 
between NIPRNet and SIPRNet traffic.  Once the KG-175D received the encrypted 
packets from the NIPRNet, it decrypts those packets and injects them on the SIPRNet.  
When the Talon or SecNet54 supported device was to receive data, the KG-175D would 
handle packets in the reverse order—receive the classified data from the SIPRNet, 
encrypt it, then transmit the encrypted packet on the NIPRNet to the recipient SCTD.  
The architecture for both devices are depicted in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. The 
primary difference between the architectures is the ability of the SecNet54 to provide 
access to an enclave of hosts rather than a single remote host. 
 
 




Figure 6.   USS Cole (DDG-67) KIV-54 Architecture for TW11. After [22]. 
B. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
1. Evaluation Criteria and Methodology 
The TW11 SCTD evaluations were designed to determine three measures; 
usability, availability, and persistence.  Usability was defined as the perceived latency, or 
responsiveness, of the system, and the ease of use with which an untrained user can setup 




the network external to the host, and securing the system for storage.  It was measured in 
both SCTD Operator Surveys, with the resultant answers being converted to either a 
“Positive” or “Negative” answer. 
The figure of availability was defined as the measure of accessibility of the 
network and the services that it provided to the user.  For this study, the number of initial 
connection attempts and the users’ problems, as articulated in the surveys, with using 
applications on the network were considered as measurement of this figure. 
Persistence as a figure of merit was defined as the consistency with which a 
network connection was maintained.  It was captured in the surveys by questions 
pertaining to the continuity of connection during the user’s session. 
The TW11 SCTD evaluation methodology consisted of the use of both operator 
surveys and Subject Matter Expert (SME) observations.  A list of Cole authorized 
SIPRNet users were generated from Cole’s SIPRNet Active Directory.  Users were 
randomly selected as they became available between duty “watches,” ship’s drill 
evolutions, and other shipboard requirements.  Users ranged from junior enlisted (E-3) to 
senior field grade officers (O-5).  Once selected, each user was assigned a duty-position 
using either a KOV-26 or KIV-54 and its associated laptop.  The user would also be 
provided a set of instructions that would guide him through the initial setup of the SCTD 
client and the required tasks to be performed.  For the Talon, the operator would perform 




Figure 7.   KOV-26 Workflow Diagram.  From [23]. 
The tasks that the operator was to perform to demonstrate the usability of the 
system included e-mailing a file between users, opening a received file, and visiting an 
external website to download a large file (516 MB).  These actions were intended to 
demonstrate to the operator any latency introduced as a result of the wireless network or 
because of the extra encryption/decryption process required by the tunneling.  By having 
the user assess the latency of the tasks as compared to performing similar tasks on a 
standard SIPRNet host, the user would be able to provide a qualitative value of the 
usability and responsiveness of the remote access capability.  As seen by the standard 
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user, latency is directly related to usability or responsiveness. An example of the 
questionnaire used to collect the survey data is provided in Figure 8. The full KOV-26 
Operator Survey can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 8.   Portion of KOV-26 Operator Survey.  From [24]. 
 Throughout the completion of the instruction sheet, the SME maintained the 
SME Observation Log, and would ask questions to get an idea of how the operator felt 
about the usability of the Talon-based access and his perception of the persistence or 
responsiveness of the SIPRNet connection.  The user would continue through the end of 
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the Talon instruction sheet, which included the shutdown of the system as the final step.  
Upon completion of all steps, the user filled out the KOV-26 Operator Survey.   
Having completed the Operator Survey for the KOV-26, the participant proceeded 
to the evaluation of the KIV-54.  At this point, he was given another instruction sheet, 
this time for the SecNet54, and the procedure to be stepped through to accomplish the 
evaluation.  Most of the steps were similar to those outlined in the KOV-26 instruction 
sheet, which included e-mailing, remotely accessing large files, and visiting an external 
webpage.  In Figure 9, the workflow for the SecNet54 is depicted. 
  
 
Figure 9.   Workflow for KIV-54 Testing. From [25]. 
It is important to note that although several users started their testing period with 
the KOV-26, this was not required.  Some users did start with the KIV-54, thereby 
finishing with the KOV-26.  Although the surveys did not ask for the user to compare the 
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devices, it was a natural progression of the testing, and many users did make a 
comparison statement in their final survey.  Additionally, some users made comments 
about the comparison between both devices to the SME that were captured in the SME 
Observation Log. 
 Throughout the completion of the instruction sheet, the SME maintained the 
SME Observation Log and would asks questions to get an idea of how the operator felt 
about the usability of the SecNet54 and their perception of the persistence of the SIPRNet 
connection.  The user continued through the end of the SecNet54 instruction sheet, which 
included the shutdown of the system as the final step.  Upon completion of all steps, the 
user completed the KIV-54 Operator Survey which is of similar form to that of the KOV-
26 Operator Survey.  The full copy of the KIV-54 Operator Survey can be found in 
Appendix B.  
Although most of the data collection was taken while users were in either the 
Radio Room or the Operations Office, there were opportunities to demonstrate the 
connection-extension capabilities of both the Talon and the SecNet54 in spaces 
throughout the ship.  These spaces included the Nixie Winch Room and the Tactical 
Towed Array Sonar (TACTAS) Room, both at the stern of the ship; the Wardroom, 
which had neither a NIPRNet nor a SIPRNet connection; the Bridge and Bridge Wings; 
and the Engineering Central Control Station (CCS).  From all spectators of these 
demonstrations, the common response was to ask, “How do we get this capability 
permanently installed?”  This was a clear indicator that they felt both devices show great 
potential to extend their SIPRNet access to otherwise un-serviced areas of the ship.  This 
matched their sentiment—as articulated in survey responses and captured in the SME 
Observation Logs—that there were too few SIPRNet machines onboard to meet the 
required classified workload. 
2. Analysis 
The testing of both SCTDs took place over a period of six days, with the goal of 
engaging at least four authorized SIPRNet users per day, for a total of 24 users in the 
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sample.  Actual sample size during TW11 expanded to 30 users.  Of those users sampled, 
none had used either SCTD prior to their evaluation during TW11. 
a. Usability 
Usability is directly related to the perceived latency of data which affects 
the user’s completion of common tasks, such as sending or receiving e-mail, opening a 
website, or downloading a file.  Usability was captured by asking questions related to the 
users’ perception of the speed in which tasks were completed, with the scale being 
“Faster than normal,” “About the same,” “Slower than normal,” or “N/A.”  Usability was 
also evaluated by the ease of use of the device.  The grading scale for this criterion was 
“Very Easy,” “Easy,” “Difficult,” “Very Difficult,” or “N/A.” 
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Table 1.   Survey Criteria for Usability  
To determine the actual usability figure of merit, the data was classified as 
a positive answer if the usability was at least the same as that of the usability of a ship’s 
installed wired SIPRNet computer.  From the scales listed above, that equated to “About 
the same” or better and “Easy” or better.  All other assigned values were considered to 




Question    POSITIVE RESPONSES NEGATIVE RESPONSES  NEUTRAL
5  Radio button  Very Easy Easy  Difficult  Very Difficult  ‐  N/A 
6  Radio button Faster than expected  Adequate
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an answer is positive or negative.  Both the KOV-26 and the KIV-54 scored well, with 
approximately 95% of the answers being positive.   
b. Availability 
Availability addresses the accessibility of the network and the services it 
provides.  Values used to quantitatively measure availability include the number of 
attempts required to connect or reconnect to the wireless network, where a value of “1” is 
considered a positive answer, and a value of “2” or greater represents a disconnect with a 
subsequent reconnect, which is interpreted as a negative answer.  Additional values 
provided by the users include “Yes” or “No” when asked if they were able to perform a 
task as outlined in the instruction sheet.  Examples of these tasks include being able to 
use Internet Explorer to download a file or sending and receiving e-mail using Outlook.  
An answer of “Yes” was categorized as a positive answer and an answer of “No” was 
listed as a negative answer.  Answers of “N/A” were treated as the user not performing 
the task for some reason.  This value was treated as neither a positive nor a negative 
response in most instances.   The one exception was in question 10, which asked “If the 
connection was lost during the session, how many times was it lost?”  For this question, 
“N/A” was treated as a positive answer, and any numeric value was treated as a negative 
response.  Table 2 provides the criteria of answers from the survey to determine whether 
the criteria are positive or negative.  
The survey results confirm an overwhelmingly positive response, with 
96% of the responses recorded for the KOV-26, and 97% of the responses recorded for 
the KIV-54 being positive. 
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Table 2.   Survey Criteria for Availability 
c. Persistence 
Although similar to availability, persistence pertains to the consistency of 
the network connection.  This is simply measured by asking the user if they had any 
problem establishing and maintaining a network connection.  This was recorded as the 
number of connection attempts performed, with “1” being the initial attempt, and 
anything greater than “1” represents a disconnect with reconnect attempts.  Table 3 
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Table 3.   Survey Criteria for Persistence 
From the survey results, both the KOV-26 and the KIV-54 scored well 
among the users, with over 90% experiencing a stable, uninterrupted connection.  Of 
those that reported having to reconnect the KOV-26, all were a result of a laptop 
malfunction, as indicated in the KOV-26 SME Observation Logs.  For those that reported 
multiple connections for the KIV-54, it was determined to be an initial setup error, such 
as a duplicate IP address or a missing certificate that is required to access the web login 
application.  Although this is an issue that should be identified under the usability metric, 
it manifested itself under the persistence metric. 
3. Summary 
This chapter discussed the methods used to determine usability of the SCTDs, the 
availability of the network and its associated services, and the persistence of the network 
connection.  Further, it presented the analysis of the data.  The operator survey results of 
the KOV-26 and the KIV-54 demonstrate that both devices provide a very persistent 
connection, and were considered very usable.  Additionally, tasks that were facilitated by 
the KOV-26 Talon or the KIV-54 SecNet54 were readily available. 
Chapter IV will analyze both SCTD solutions in the context of enhancing 
Command and Control (C2) for an embarked commander and his staff as we envision the 
devices to be employed.  Considerations for the SCTD employment will also be 
discussed pertaining to network security. 
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IV. ASSESSING CONSTRAINTS AND OPERATIONAL UTILITY 
OF EXTENDING THE CLASSIFIED NETWORK 
A. OVERVIEW 
From the previous chapter, one can see that both the KOV-26 and the KIV-54 
provide value to the users of classified hosts.  In almost all cases, the ease-of-use and 
persistent, reliable connection provided by both SCTDs were remarked to have provided 
great value to the ship as they were able to extend the SIPRNet throughout the ship.  
Additionally, the minimal cost and ease of installation of these SCTDs make fielding 
them a much more palatable proposition than that of fielding permanent classified 
network connections throughout the ship. 
 While the value of employing SCTDs over a NIPRNet wireless LAN has proven 
to be an operationally worthwhile venture, it is not meant to replace the current wired 
architecture of an afloat SIPRNet enclave.  Classified network connections should still be 
utilized for access to network resources as a redundant, yet different path.  The wired 
network is still an important part of a command and control node and must be maintained 
for full employment during times when RF communications are not possible. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the operational utility of fielding the 
SCTDs as a method of extending the ship’s classified network in order to enhance the C2 
capabilities as they apply to the embarked commander, both U.S. and allied.  Further, the 
inherent risks associated with fielding an SCTD solution, and the mitigations to those 
risks are examined. 
B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The KOV-26 Talon and the KIV-54 SecNet54 both provide wired and wireless 
extension of a ships classified network.  Although both are similar in this respect, their 
scheme of employment is markedly different.  The KOV-26 provides for better mobility 
than the KIV-54, in a much smaller form factor.  However, the KOV-26 can be used for 
 
 34
only one device at a time, whereas the KIV-54 has the ability to connect multiple hosts in 
a single enclave.  It is this distinction between the two devices that will dictate the 
operational use of either device. 
Both SCTDs can be used to enhance command and control by embarked 
commanders and their staffs in spaces that either do not have the required number of 
classified connections or do not have any installed classified connections to address the 
communications requirements that support effective command and control at that C2 
node.  A summary of characteristics of both the Talon and the SecNet54 can be found in 
Table 4. 
1. KOV-26 
The KOV-26 Talon is best suited for individual access to network services such 
as file sharing, collaborative tools, chat, and e-mail—that is, a single host connecting to 
the classified network.  Situations where the capability of this SCTD is ideal for an 
embarked commander include being able to maintain situational awareness of his 
assigned forces while roaming throughout his flagship.   He would have at his disposal a 
Common Operational Picture (COP), e-mail and chat communications with his Staff 
Tactical Action Officer (STAO) and subordinate commanders, as well as his superiors.   
Another example of where the KOV-26 Talon is beneficial to an embarked naval 
commander is in the case where Marines have embarked on an amphibious ship.  With 
the ship having wireless LAN coverage throughout the superstructure, as well as in the 
well deck, Marines waiting to be launched from the well deck can sustain classified 
communications with their commanders to maintain situational awareness of the 
objectives of the amphibious assault.  Additionally, the Marines standing by in the well-
deck can transmit equipment status updates to the commander’s staff, keeping the staff 
apprised of changes as they occur in near real-time.  This same SCTD enabled host that 
connected to the ship’s wireless LAN can then be used in forward operating areas by 
connecting to the wired or wireless LAN of the forward operations base. 
To this point, we have only addressed the embarkation of a U.S. commander and 
his staff on a U.S. Navy vessel with SIPRNet as the required classified network.  On 
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numerous occasions, however, the embarked commander and his staff may be that of a 
coalition partner to support a combined exercise or a coalition contingency operation.  
When these commanders and their staffs embark a Navy warship, they require access to 
several CENTRIXS computers.  On U.S. Navy destroyers, the only CENTRIXS hosts are 
found in the Combat Information Center (CIC) or in the Radio Room.  This does not 
provide enough access to classified releasable hosts for the commander, his STAO, or his 
staff.  
Keying the Talon with the appropriate CENTRIXS key, the commander or his 
STAO, or both depending on the number of Talons available, will be able to access all 
collaboration tools and documents available on the CENTRIXS enclave, enhancing his 
ability to command and control not only his national forces, but the coalition forces as 
well.  Through the use of an SCTD enabled CENTRIXS host, the commander can access 
message traffic, e-mails, documents and chat rooms that are common throughout the 









Table 4.   SCTD Characteristics Comparison 
2. KIV-54 
The KIV-54 SecNet54 can provide access to classified data for a single host much 
like that of the KOV-26.  However, the external power requirements of the SecNet54 
make it much less mobile than that of the Talon.  The value of the SecNet54 can be found 
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in its ability to create an enclave of multiple classified hosts from one SecNet54.  
Although not ideally suited for a single point C2 node, it can be used by a staff to support 
the commander and his C2 nodes. 
Typical staff complements of an embarked commander include planning cells, 
operations cells, and intelligence cells, each of which has classified data access 
requirements.  Continuing with the illustration of a commander and his staff embarking a 
U.S. Navy destroyer, the staff is generally assigned a space within which to work that 
may not meet these requirements.  Examples of typical spaces assigned to the embarked 
staff are the classroom, which contains no more than two NIPRNet connections with no 
SIPRNet connections, or the Operations Office, which contains two SIPRNet connections 
and one or two NIPRNet connections.  Neither space is adequate to support the needs of 
the staff and its different cells. 
Adding a SecNet54 and a multiport switch to either space will address the 
requirements imposed by the staff.  By creating a classified enclave in a single space, the 
staff and its cells will be able to work simultaneously, either independently or 
collaboratively at the same classification level.  This increases the efficiency of the staff 
planning process by providing the needed access to classified information such as 
commander’s intent promulgated via message traffic, intelligence fusion products, and 
current operational status depicted on a COP. 
The SecNet54 also provides great value in supporting an embarked coalition 
commander and his staff.  Like the Talon, the SecNet54 can be keyed to a CENTRIXS 
enclave, allowing all hosts connected to the SecNet54 to access all classified data 
available to that particular CENTRIXS enclave.  This information includes coalition 
releasable classified e-mail, documents, and chat.  Additionally, a Voice-over IP (VoIP) 
phone can be attached to the commercial switch that is connected to the SecNet54, 




The characteristic differences of the Talon and the SecNet54 depicted above 
indicate each SCTD is ideal for a different type of employment with a distinctly different 
group of users.  These considerations must be taken into account prior to planning, 
acquiring, and deploying an SCTD solution.   
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
Although SCTD technology provides an efficient means to extend the classified 
network to virtually any space on a wireless-LAN enabled ship, there are security 
requirements that must be met prior to employing an SCTD enabled host.  Information 
assurance and systems security must be considered by both the technicians and the users 
of the classified hosts. 
1. Physical Security 
It is the responsibility of the user of an SCTD enabled host to maintain the 
security of that host.  As discussed in Chapter II, both SCTDs are considered a Controlled 
Cryptographic Item (CCI)—that is, they are unclassified but accountable.  As CCI, they 
must be physically maintained on a person or in a GSA approved safe or facility certified 
to secure classified information [26].  The security of the SCTD is not the only 
consideration, however.  The host itself must be handled at the highest classification level 
of the data that it has accessed or will be maintained on that host.  Since the host is a 
computer, with a processor, memory, and storage, the classified data remains on the host.  
It is this quality of the host that dictates that it be handled at the classification level of the 
data.  The host must be accounted for at all times, never being left unattended by an 
authorized, cleared user.  When not being used, the host must be stored in a certified safe 
or storage facility 
When deploying either SCTD in a shipboard space, great care must be taken as to 
the classification access level of the personnel that have access to that space.  The user is 
responsible to ensure that no person could view or access information made available by 
the SCTD enabled host that does not have the proper clearance and a need-to-know.  By 
allowing non-cleared personnel in the space, there is a potential for classified data 
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compromise as a result of shoulder surfing, where an unauthorized individual uses direct 
observation techniques to find out information.  This information could be in the form of 
text from e-mail, COP data, or collaboration tools.  Worse yet, a username and password 
could be gleaned to logon to the system for future exploitation. 
To mitigate the physical risks to the system, standard practices must be followed.  
Securing the SCTD and the host when not in use or maintaining positive control by an 
authorized user must be enforced through command policy and practice.  Preventing 
unauthorized access to the data provided by the SCTD enabled host, whether incidental 
or malicious, can be achieved through securing the space in which the host is being used.  
By controlling the access to the space, the risk of compromise is reduced to acceptable 
levels. 
 2. Administrative Controls 
As directed by the Secretary of the Navy in Instruction 5510.36A, every 
Department of the Navy command will establish an Information Security Program that 
meets, at a minimum, the policies set forth in the Information Security Manual [26], [27].  
It is the policies that a command generates, as directed by the Secretary of the Navy, 
which provides the foundation for the protection of the command’s information. 
Examples of these controls include determination of who has the requisite 
clearances and further refining that list to include only those with a need to know [26].  
By providing accounts and passwords to only those individuals that require access to the 
system, the attack surface is decreased, with fewer accounts being available to attempt to 
exploit. 
3. Logical Controls 
With each SCTD, the user must logon to the device in order to enable tunneling of 
data.  Until a session is established, there is no data transmission between the network 
and the device.  An assigned username and password is an example of the logical controls 
used in the extension of the network through the use of the SCTDs.  This separate 
username and password scheme is also a matter of defending the network through a 
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Defense-in-Depth approach.  On initial logon, the user establishes a connection with the 
tunneling device which permits a connection to the classified network, but does not allow 
access to network resources.  At this point, the user must authenticate against the 
classified domain using his username and password associated with his resources on the 
network.  In other words, just because users have access to the resources on the ship’s 
SIPRNet does not mean that they may necessarily have an account that would gain them 
access to the tunneling capability.  Conversely, if a user were to gain access to the 
tunneling device, but did not have access to the ship’s SIPRNet, he would still not be able 
to access resources found on the ship’s classified domain. 
Additional logical controls would be enforced at the domain level, maintaining 
the same controls that are implemented throughout the classified wired network.  This 
allows further segregation of network resources so fewer personnel would have access, 
again minimizing the potential attack surface.  As an example, personnel from the 
Intelligence Department would be the only authorized users to gain access to a particular 
set of documents under an Intel file share. 
With prudent implementation of these controls, potential risks introduced by the 
use of SCTD enabled hosts to extend the classified network are reduced to acceptable 
levels.  That is to say, if a commander has a functioning and acceptable Information 
Security Program in place and his personnel are properly trained on the requirements of 
the program, there should be little concern in the commander’s mind about extending his 
classified network to enhance command and control. 
D. UTILITY TO COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The utility of using either SCTD is that it extends the classified network to where 
it is needed.  Although it will benefit ship’s company to have classified access in spaces 
that would not otherwise have such access, the purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the 
value, if any, of SCTD utility to command and control, and thereby its potential for 
improving support for an embarked commander.   
Command and control is an operational art made up of six elements.  These 
elements include maintaining alignment, providing situational awareness, advancing the 
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plan, complying with procedures, countering the enemy, and adjusting apportionment.  
These elements are inherent in every warfare area—air defense, surface warfare, 
submarine warfare, information operations, and others [3].  To exercise command and 
control at a speed that will allow the commander to address these elements faster than the 
enemy commander can react, the correct support systems must be in place and able to 
meet the commander’s requirements. 
The employment of an SCTD solution allows the embarked commander and his 
staff to efficiently address each element of command and control from any space onboard 
the flagship.  In order to maintain alignment, the commander must be able to generate 
and promulgate his intent to his subordinate commanders.  This is traditionally done 
through message traffic, and more currently through e-mail and collaboration tools, all of 
which can be accomplished using an SCTD-enabled host. 
The hosts also are capable of providing situational awareness.  By using a host 
that has a Common Operational Picture application installed, the device can tunnel to the 
COP server to get the data needed to update its COP software.  This provides the 
necessary situational awareness required by the commander at near real time.  This 
capability allows the commander to determine if enemy composition is as expected, 
friendly forces are in accordance with plan, and whether forces are executing according 
to his transmitted intent [3]. 
To advance the plan, the commander must be able to monitor execution of the 
plan and match that against the timeline.  Further, he must be able to ascertain when there 
is deviation from the plan due to an unforeseen condition [3].  This can be achieved 
through the use of chat and collaboration tools that reside on the SCTD enabled device.  
From any space in his flagship, the commander and his staff can receive the information 
about the change condition, adjust the plan accordingly, and transmit the new intentions 
all in order to move the plan forward. 
Compliance with procedure is determined by the commander and his staff through 
the monitoring of plan execution.  Compliance is ascertained by comparing the current 
execution with the plan as published in commander’s intent, special instructions, and 
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operational orders.  It is this compliance that provides for execution efficiencies and helps 
avoid friendly fire situations [3].  The capability to monitor compliance is achieved from 
the collaboration tools that are embedded in the SCTD hosts.  From any space on the 
ship, the commander and his staff can monitor progress of the plan as reported in a chat 
client and view force disposition and progress from a generated COP. 
To counter the enemy, timely and accurate intelligence information must be 
available to the commander and his staff at his C2 nodes to prepare the battle space.  As 
the battle unfolds, and emerging intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
information becomes available, the commander can formulate counter operations.  This 
depends on receiving reliable, accurate information at the C2 node [3].  By extending the 
shipboard classified network to assigned staff spaces, each staff cell has access to the 
same information at the same time, leading to more efficient planning and operational 
execution. 
Through monitoring of the battle, changes to enemy force disposition and tactics, 
or friendly asset availability will be noted by the commander.  This information must be 
timely in order to allow the commander to adjust apportionment of all of his forces, 
communications, and time.  As Admiral Willard notes, “Very often, the operational 
commander, who knows what is occurring in all warfare areas and can judge the 
consequences of a change in timing in one element, is in the best position to make the 
call” [3].  To be in the best position to make the call, the commander and his staff must 
have timely, accurate, and reliable information.  This is not possible without that 
information being readily available to the commander at his C2 nodes.  The KOV-26 and 
the KIV-54 both enhance the commander’s command and control capability by extending 
or increasing access to the C2 network to his C2 nodes and staff workspaces. 
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we discuss the operational considerations for employing the KOV-
26 Talon and the KIV-54 SecNet54.  The characteristics of mobility, multiple hosts 
capability, and power source determined the preferred mode of deployment for each 
device.  The KOV-26 is more mobile; with power being provided by the host, but can 
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only enable tunneling on one host.  These characteristics make the Talon ideally suited to 
support the commander or his STAO.  Conversely, the SecNet54 required an external 
power source, thereby reducing mobility.  However, one KIV-54 could support tunneling 
of multiple hosts, making it ideal for setting up an enclave in a space to support staff 
planning and operations. 
We also examined the potential risks of employing these devices throughout a 
shipboard environment.  With proper mitigation, the risks are far outweighed by the value 
that these devices provide by extending the classified network to spaces that the 






V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS  
The demonstrations and evaluations of the KOV-26 Talon and the KIV-54 
SecNet54 performed by the officers and crew of the USS Cole (DDG 67) during Trident 
Warrior 2011 illustrated the value of tunneling secret data through an unclassified 
wireless LAN.  SCTD user surveys were completed to help quantify the value these 
devices provided as measured in usability, availability, and persistence.   
The results of the user surveys showed that users were overwhelmingly positive in 
their critique of both SCTDs, with a greater than 90% positive score for each measured 
area.  This indicates that in the opinions of the sampled SIPRNet users, the Talon and the 
SecNet54 performed adequately to extend a ships’ classified network.  By extending the 
classified network, ship’s company technicians can rapidly and painlessly provide a C2 
node in any space throughout the ship to support the requirements of the embarked 
commander and his staff. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis studied two Secret Client Tunneling Devices that were able to be used 
over an existing afloat wireless LAN to enhance command and control in spaces that did 
not previously support command and control from the wired SIPRNet.  By tunneling 
classified data through the unclassified wireless pathway, SIPRNet hosts were able to 
transmit and receive classified data at speeds equal to or greater than that provided by the 
ship’s existing wired SIPRNet.  Although this configuration worked extremely well, there 
are questions that could be answered with further research. 
This study looked at the KOV-26 and the KIV-54 tunneling data to and from a 
SIPRNet host in the form of a laptop.  Both devices had to be physically connected to the 
laptop by PCMCIA port (KOV-26) or an Ethernet RJ-45 connection (KIV-54). Although 
a laptop provides mobility, it does not provide the most convenient form factor to be truly 
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mobile throughout a ship.  A potential area of study would be to look at similar tunneling 
devices that would enable smaller mobile devices such as smart-phones or tablet 
computers to connect wirelessly and tunnel classified data across the wireless LAN.   
No matter which form of hosts is implemented, there is a question of security that 
must be maintained in order to keep the confidentiality of the data intact.  During this 
study, laptops were utilized to access classified data.  Because the laptop handles data by 
storing information in RAM and on disk, the laptop itself is classified at the same level as 
that of the highest classification of handled data.  However, it would be much easier to 
maintain security if the host itself could stay unclassified when it is not connected or 
logged onto a tunneling device.  This idea is similar to current thin client architectures 
with the host device (dumb terminal) being capable of reaching back to the servers, 
through the wireless LAN, where storage, manipulation and processing of the classified 
takes place. 
Because this thesis looked at the use of a shipboard wireless LAN with greater 
than 95% coverage of the ship, it would be beneficial to examine the use of such a system 
from the context of Electronic Warfare.  Future work could explore questions such as: 
How does our potential reliance on these systems leave us vulnerable to exploitation or 
jamming? What is our concept of operations in a restricted Emissions Control (EMCON) 
environment? These future efforts may help in our understanding of how to best leverage 
local wireless communications aboard ship. 
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APPENDIX A. TW11 SCTD OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS 
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B. KIV 54 OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS 
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APPENDIX B. TW11 SCTD SURVEYS  
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